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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the concepts of risk behavior and Risk Homeostasis Theory as proposed 
by Wilde (1982a). While additional theory is presented about gain- and loss-framed messag-
es and their possible effects on behavior, risk behavior is discussed both theoretically and 
practically in the context of negative and positive consequences of behavior and in light of 
recent research. Both notions were combined into an experiment that allowed for objective 
measurements of risk behavior. This experiment tested the influences of a) varying degrees 
of objective safety and b) of gain- and loss-framed messages highlighting the consequences 
of actions on risk behavior. While gain- or loss-framed messages both showed no statistically 
significant influence on risk behavior in comparison to a control group, a higher amount of 
objective safety was compensated for by participants through more risky behavior, albeit 
not in all variables used to measure risk behavior. Potential flaws in the experimental ma-
nipulations and the implications of these finding for the future of RHT research and accident 
prevention are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview of risk, risk behavior and homeostasis 
It is common knowledge that part of the human behavior repertoire is taking risk. 
From an evolutionary perspective, it made sense for our ancestors to engage in potentially 
dangerous activities when the reward was high. As a hunter, hunting a large animal will pro-
vide an entire family or clan with food and other important supplies for a long period of 
time; however, large animals can also pose a considerable danger to the group of hunters. 
Therefore, taking the risk of being injured during a hunt was sometimes a necessity if food 
was scarce. In the present day, regardless of interindividual differences in the amount of risk 
people are generally willing to take, everybody exhibits behavior at least at a few points in 
their life that can be considered “risky”. But what exactly is risk and why do people take it? 
There are multiple definitions of risk in circulation and the following one has been 
created for the purpose of this thesis: 
“Risk is a subjective measurement for the probability of a negative consequence occurring because of 
any action or decision. The measurement is subjective because every individual perceives the weight of negative 
consequences and its relation to positive consequences differently. Risk is therefore related to the uncertainty of 
outcome as without uncertainty, a decision never bears risk.” 
This definition is broad in nature to enable it to be generalized across multiple do-
mains. The connection to the uncertainty of outcome is made out of logical necessity – if the 
outcome of an action or decision is absolutely certain and therefore without alternatives, it 
cannot be considered risky. It should be noted that absolute certainty of outcome is very 
likely unattainable in real situations and is more of theoretical nature, as even for simple 
actions, the long-term consequences are not calculable in a reliable manner. Regardless, the 
outcome of an action is a large factor in the decision process for carrying out that action. 
It is safe to assume that a negative consequence of a behavior is something people 
want to avoid. However, why is it the case that humans exhibit behavior that can potentially 
have negative consequences? Why do they take risks? The obvious answer would be that 
they expect a positive outcome of any kind that outweighs the negatives – however, the 
An investigation of risk compensation and the influence of gain-framed and loss-framed messages on risk behavior in a laboratory-based video game experiment 5 
 
nature of these potential gains is not always inherently obvious. While it seems intuitive to 
say that humans are able to judge the weight of positive vs. negative outcomes of a behav-
ior, the fact that some people are willing to take a lot more risk than others makes this mat-
ter slightly more complicated; are some people just better at “objectively” judging risk and 
potential loss and gains? A better explanation lies within the context of sensation-seeking. It 
has been shown that individuals who more strongly seek sensation also show more risky 
behavior (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1992). Further, high sensation-seekers tend to estimate risk 
as lower than low sensation-seekers, even if both groups have never participated in the 
(risky) activity in question. Adding to these findings, research has also demonstrated that the 
relationship between sensation-seeking and risky behavior is mediated by the judgment of 
cost and benefit (Maslowsky et al., 2011). Specifically, individuals higher in sensation-seeking 
assign more value to the potential benefits of a behavior and less (negative) value to the 
potential costs in comparison to individuals low in sensation-seeking, for whom the inverse 
relationship for judging gains and losses has been found. Additionally, valuing the potential 
benefits higher than the costs is a considerable predictor for engaging in a risky behavior. 
Therefore, sensation-seeking seems to play an important role in the explanation as to why 
humans take risks. However, when assessing the questions how and when humans take risk, 
one needs to look into the mechanisms behind risk assessment and risk taking behavior. 
Originally, the term homeostasis was not created to explain human risk behavior. 
Homeostasis originates in the Greek language and is a combination of homœos, meaning 
“similar”, and stasis, meaning “standing still”. The term describes the process within a sys-
tem that allows its conditions to remain constant over time through changes in variables 
that, in the grand scheme, cancel each other out so that the overarching state of the system 
remains the same. Examples for such homeostatic systems are body temperature (only in 
endothermic animals such as mammals and birds), which remains constant regardless of 
varying outside temperatures and other conditions, as well as regulation of the blood pH at 
7.365. Even though the term was coined in 1926, if was not until more than 50 years later 
that it was used in combination with risk behavior. 
In 1982, Wilde developed the theory of risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1982a). Originally, 
risk homeostasis theory (from here on abbreviated as RHT) was supposed to serve as an 
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overarching explanatory framework for traffic accidents and their causation. Wilde identifies 
risk taking as one of the primary causes for accidents and proposes that a person engaging in 
driving a vehicle (or in a comparable task) at every moment evaluates two distinct risk levels: 
the state of the perceived risk level and the state of desired (or target) risk level. According 
to Wilde, in case of a discrepancy between these two risk levels, a person adjusts their be-
havior to match them again. This indicates that, in case the perceived risk level is lower than 
the desired risk level, the person will behave more recklessly, while switched risk levels 
cause the person to adjust their behavior into the other direction and be more cautious. The 
main point of Wilde’s proposition is that the desired level of risk in a population remains 
essentially constant over time and that therefore safety regulations or tools such as seat-
belts have, at most, a temporary effect on the overall number and severity of traffic acci-
dents. In the example of seatbelts, while they do increase the safety of the vehicle being 
driven, they do not increase the driver’s desire to be safe, resulting in a behavioral change 
caused by the decrease in perceived risk level such as driving faster or more recklessly, ulti-
mately canceling out the added safety effect of the seatbelt. This is generalized to all safety 
standards, meaning that although vehicles become safer, accident rates show no measure-
able deviation from consistency over time, which Wilde cites evidence for. Originally, the 
theory was labeled risk compensation, but to align the name with the findings just described, 
the term homeostasis was deemed to fit better. In RHT, accident rates are compared to a 
thermostat, where the only way to change the resulting room temperature is to change the 
desired temperature in the settings. All other changes merely cause the thermostat to 
adapt, trying to keep the room temperature at the level it was assigned to keep it at. While 
this comparison does have the shortcoming of comparing a simple technical device to the 
dynamic and reactive variables of traffic, it has an important implication for the overall re-
duction of occurrence and severity of traffic accidents: Wilde ultimately proposes that the 
only way to reliably reduce traffic accidents and the associated death rates is to reduce the 
amount of risk drivers are willing to take, or, in other words, increase their desire for safety 
(in the thermostat analogy, this would equal to lowering the desired temperature on the 
thermostat). The underlying processes are outlined in the model below. 
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Figure 1: Wilde’s original model created to explain the homeostatic mechanism is displayed as a slightly 
simplified version. 
The question arises whether RHT can be applied to domains other than traffic. It has 
long been hypothesized that humans are characterized by an optimal level of psychophysio-
logical arousal (for the initial publications on this idea, see Leuba, 1955 and Hebb, 1955). It 
can therefore be hypothesized that taking considerable risks is a means to achieve this opti-
mal arousal level, which would in turn indicate that RHT is applicable to areas other than 
traffic and is, in fact, quite a universal theory. 
Historically, RHT has not been developed much further theoretically; however, it has 
been both tested in simulated environments and evaluated in real situations. An early ex-
ample is the study of Jackson & Blackman (1994), which aimed to investigate whether the 
propositions made by RHT could be confirmed in a driving simulator test. RHT predicts that 
only changes in the amount of risk people are willing to take will have a (lasting) effect on 
accident rates. In this regard, Jackson & Blackman chose either high or low accident costs as 
a manipulation, expecting accident costs to influence the amount of risk people are willing to 
take through changes in the costs- and benefits-analysis. Additionally, a high or low speed 
limit and a high or low fine for speeding were used as manipulations with the expectation 
that both should not have an influence on overall accident occurrence as they do not influ-
ence the desired (target) level of risk. The results of this experiment confirmed the hypothe-
ses made and, upon further data investigation, revealed that increasing the accident costs 
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did indeed decrease accident frequency; however, it had no influence on the speed chosen 
by the drivers. This might indicate that increasing accident costs might heighten alertness 
and salience of accidents, effectively increasing focus and attention while driving at higher 
speed, making accidents caused by gaps in attention less likely to occur. 
Another study in this area was conducted by Glendon et al. (1996), which investigat-
ed RHT in the context of utility, with the question if taking risk and the homeostatic process 
exist either “for their own sake” or only if there is some form of utility for the risk-taker. It 
was found that risk homeostasis might have to be viewed in the context of sensation-
seeking, which of course can be seen as a form of utility as well. Additionally, Glendon and 
colleagues observed that risk compensation can occur in the very short term (RHT generally 
predicts homeostatic processes to take place over years, through lagged feedback) and that 
those short-term adjustments to new risk levels might be over-compensatory. The authors 
implied that future research needs to identify the exact pathways through which risk home-
ostasis takes place and “block” them experimentally, answering the question whether risk 
homeostasis disappears or finds another utility or new pathway through which it will mani-
fest itself. This approach has not been taken experimentally to the present day. 
Although more theoretical in nature, RHT has been proposed to have major implica-
tions for and contributions to real-life situations. As the theory predicts that perceived level 
and target level of risk are a major influence on risk behavior, it has been proposed (Wilde, 
1989) that effective and lasting accident reduction can only be achieved through a reduction 
of the target level of risk in the population as a whole. This corresponds to lowering the tar-
get level of risk in every individual, which, viewed from the opposite perspective, means in-
creasing everybody’s desire for safety, which is assumed to lead to the same result. Accord-
ingly, another repeatedly occurring claim (Simonet & Wilde, 1997) was that making activities 
objectively safer (for example through the addition of seatbelts or other safety equipment) 
has no lasting effects on actual accident occurrence as it does not influence people’s desire 
to be safe. According to Wilde (2005), providing a safety- incentives program would be fruit-
ful: for drivers to manage their risk better, their recognition of risk must improve and their 
willingness to accept risk must decline. While the former factor is difficult to influence, the 
latter has been successfully reduced in programs involving incentives (for example mone-
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tary) to keep the amount of risky actions while driving to a minimum. Wilde additionally 
proposes that incentives are inherently better than rewards as incentives can influence be-
havior before they are given. 
Additional support for RHT “from the field” was provided as well (Aschenbrenner & 
Biehl (1994), as cited by Simonet & Wilde, 1997). In Munich, taxicabs started to get equipped 
with ABS (anti-lock brakes), which is a system that keeps the ability to steer the car intact 
even in the event of a full application of the brake. In line with RHT’s predictions, the taxi 
drivers who had their vehicles equipped with such a system changed their driving behavior 
to compensate for the added safety provided, resulting in the accident rates of taxicabs stay-
ing constant over time. These findings were confirmed in another country as well, with the 
added realization that drivers used the new ABS to increase speed instead of decreasing 
braking distance (Grant & Smiley (1993), as cited by Simonet & Wilde, 1997). Finally, Simo-
net and Wilde (1997) introduced the business cycle as another influence on accident rates, 
providing evidence that traffic death rates increase in times of economic prosperity while 
they decrease in times of financial crisis or recession. This is viewed as a confirmation for the 
underlying processes of RHT: in times of critical financial situations, the costs of accidents (e. 
g. car repairs) receive considerably more weight, while the perceived potential (monetary) 
gains made through speeding and other risky behavior are reduced. Lastly, although RHT 
was created for car traffic, a confirmation for its mechanics was found elsewhere (Baniela & 
Ríos, 2010). Despite continuous improvements of safety standards and regulations in ship 
navigation, the number of observed shipping casualties has not dropped measurably. The 
explanation given by the authors lies partially in the payment system commonly used in ship 
transportation: It is common practice to pay Captains based on how quickly they can reach 
their destination. In this light, it is understandable that new safety standards cause a change 
in perceived level of risk, which, combined with the monetary incentive to rush, causes Cap-
tains to go faster than usual because they are under the impression that their ships are now 
safer than before, ultimately going fast and careless enough to cancel out the added safety 
effect of new measures or regulations. This kind of compensatory behavior is in line with the 
proposed mechanics of RHT. 
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As with many scientific theories, RHT is not without its critics. One very straightfor-
ward but thorough analysis of existing traffic data (Evans, 1986) came to the conclusion that 
all these data do not support RHT and appear to be refuting it in part or as a whole. The pro-
posed equilibrium of fatalities has never been found in many differently coded traffic acci-
dent data and even an analysis of all recorded fatalities (not only in traffic) since 1900 did 
not reveal a homeostatic trend. Additionally, contrary to the predictions of RHT, different 
types of roads do indeed differ in the amount of accidents happening on them. Finally, Evans 
showed that even the evidence originally cited to support RHT suffers from methodological 
shortcomings and appears to refute RHT upon further investigation. There are several other 
studies taking a similar position on RHT in general (McKenna, 1987, O’Neill & Williams, 1998, 
Wilde, Robertson & Pless, 2002). 
Additional criticism expressed on multiple occasions (Hoyes & Glendon, 1993, Glen-
don et al., 1996, Adams, 1988) concerns the inability of RHT to be falsified. It is a require-
ment for any scientific theory to make claims that can be proven wrong and the above au-
thors agree on the view that RHT is, for all practical purposes, not falsifiable. Hoyes and 
Glendon state that RHT can theoretically not be falsified (as falsification itself is at its core a 
theoretical concept), while Adams describes RHT as plausible, but untestable. Glendon et al. 
form the proposition that RHT is not falsifiable “in the field”, as not all potential pathways 
through which homeostasis might happen can be controlled for here, but that a sufficiently 
sophisticated laboratory experiment might be able to detect the mechanisms through which 
homeostasis takes place. The view that RHT is not falsifiable in real traffic situations is also 
shared by Hoyes and Glendon (1993), who add the following point: if the only way to change 
accident rates is to alter the target level of risk, then how can we tell if the target level of risk 
has actually changed? Looking at accident statistics as the only measurement for this is circu-
lar and therefore fruitless. Additionally, the authors state that if RHT really aims to explain all 
risk behavior, a drop in traffic accidents might very well be accompanied by a rise in acci-
dents in an unrelated field that will remain undetected. Regardless of the (at times quite 
heated) debate concerning RHT, maybe the state and place in science of this theory is best 
summed up by Adams (1988), who described RHT as a metaphysical concept that accounts 
for behavior which no one has yet succeeded in pinning down and measuring with a tool 
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accepted by scientists. Even though RHT is untestable in the real-world situations it was orig-
inally invented for, it is full of insight and meaning that might very well have consequences 
for how we view risk behavior as a general concept. Considering all these notions, the obvi-
ous step is to investigate RHT in the laboratory, where the highest amount of control over 
the circumstances or potential risk behavior can be exerted. 
When testing RHT in the laboratory, there are a few potential pitfalls to be taken into 
consideration. According to Glendon et al. (1996), testing risk compensation or homeostasis 
in the laboratory greatly shortens the time in which multiple accidents or near-misses hap-
pen (for example in the case of a driving simulator), which is why one can expect the home-
ostatic process to take place within a relatively short timeframe. However, it is absolutely 
vital to encourage participants to take the experiment very seriously, as of course a “crash” 
in a simulation does never bear any real danger to the utilizing person. This, if treating the 
experiment like a real situation is not stressed enough, might lead to participants taking ei-
ther a lot more risk than usual because there are no real consequences or to take no risk at 
all, because the associated psychophysiological arousal does not take place as easily or simp-
ly does not appear. A general concern that was raised about RHT in laboratory settings was 
that, because the possibility of real, actual harm is always absent, RHT studies might only 
become investigations of optimization behavior instead of homeostatic processes (Hoyes & 
Glendon, 1993). However, authors generally agree (Hoyes et al., 1996, Glendon et al., 1996, 
Hoyes & Glendon, 1993) that investigating RHT in simulated laboratory settings is the only 
truly fruitful way to uncover the mechanisms through which risk compensation and homeo-
stasis take place because of the level of control they provide in contrast to field experiments 
or observations. 
1.2 The present experiment 
For the present thesis, an experiment was conducted with the aim to uncover possi-
ble influences of certain types of messages on risk behavior and with the additional goal to 
confirm the processes of risk compensation and homeostasis proposed by Wilde (1982a). 
The idea for the effect of certain types of messages on risk behavior was at first more of an-
ecdotal than of scientific nature. It had been observed that drivers participating in so-called 
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driver safety training sometimes altered their behavior in traffic in a way that was not in-
tended by the training. Driver safety training mainly consists of bringing drivers into situa-
tions that are objectively dangerous. On a specialized training course, drivers learn to remain 
in control over their car in these situations as much as possible. As an example, drivers are 
instructed to drive at a certain speed and after a few meters, a plate under the back wheels 
is quickly moved to one side, making the car spin around its vertical axis. The safety instruc-
tor now teaches the driver how to regain control over the spinning car by utilizing certain 
steering patterns. This one and other situations serve the purpose of preparing drivers for 
dangerous situations in traffic and equipping them with the knowledge and skills for reacting 
correctly in those situations. Additionally, driver safety training also teaches how to assess 
the signs of a dangerous situation coming up and how to avoid it if possible, along with the 
important notion that all dangerous situations should be avoided, if possible. While certainly 
a promising procedure on paper, practical observations have shown that drivers who have 
participated in driver safety training exhibit one of two behaviors: they either become more 
careful and defensive in traffic as intended, or they drive more recklessly because they now 
feel like they can get any dangerous situation under control before any harmful conse-
quences occur. While at first an anecdotal observation, it turned out to be indeed scientifi-
cally confirmed that driver safety training is far less effective in traffic casualty prevention 
than assumed (for an overview, see Christie, 2001). Based on this, it was hypothesized that 
driver training might be counterproductive for some people because instead of stressing 
what could be lost in case of a traffic accident, it stresses (not intentionally, of course) what 
could be gained by using the new knowledge and skills to avoid dangerous situations, lead-
ing to people overestimating their newfound abilities and compensating for the new per-
ceived safety level by engaging in more dangerous traffic behavior. It has therefore further 
been hypothesized that risk behavior could be influenced by how the message of the effects 
of behavior is conveyed: it might very well be that positive, gain-framed messages have a 
different effect on behavior than negative, loss-framed messages do. Research confirms dif-
ferent effects of both kinds of messages on risk behavior (Hwang et al., 2012); however, it 
was hypothesized that it should also make a difference how these messages are conveyed, 
for example if people are merely educated about the potential consequences of a behavior 
or if the consequences are actively demonstrated to them (as it is the case in driver safety 
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training). The idea that conveying a message of behavioral consequences either through text 
or through demonstration (for example by video) might lead to different behavior came to 
mind because reading about and viewing these consequences employs different mental 
pathways. While viewing is more easily applicable to the actual situation as it shows the ac-
tual situation, it also requires less cognitive focus to watch than it does to read. Watching a 
video of behavioral consequence is more passive than reading a text about it as reading is 
one of the most complex actions the human brain is capable of and requires considerable 
concentration. Two mental pathways differing in their depths of information processing 
have been proposed on multiple occasions in cognitive psychology, with probably the most 
common being the Dual Process Theory (for a summarizing overview, see Kahneman (2003)). 
According to Dual Process Theory, any mental operation and cognitive analysis of reality can 
be carried out either through the fast-thinking, heuristics-employing system 1, or through 
the reflective, slower, reason-bound system 2. System 1 is responsible for fast reactions and 
intuitive judgments, while system 2 leads to thought-out, educated decisions. Applied to the 
present experiment, it can be hypothesized that the inherently more passive nature of 
watching a video can lead to it being processed quickly and without much cognitive impact 
through system 1, while the requirement of concentration for reading a text causes it to be 
processes more thoroughly through system 2. However, as said before, the video demon-
stration of consequences applies better to actual reality than a text does, therefore it could 
also be expected that the video message is analyzed through system 2 as well. To account 
for both possibilities, the hypotheses for this experiment did not specify an expected direc-
tion of difference between these two conditions. To investigate the different effects of these 
messages on risk behavior (and to find out if there are any), a video game based experiment 
was conducted that allowed for precise data gathering. 
As the second objective of this experiment was to investigate the risk compensation 
and homeostasis mechanisms proposed by Wilde (1982a), the video game was programmed 
to allow for multiple gameplay rounds of varying safety for the player. It is hypothesized 
that, according to Wilde’s theory, the introduction of “barriers” that make the game safer 
(such as seatbelts in cars, which make driving objectively safer) will not affect the players’ 
desire to be safe and will as such lead to an adaption in risk behavior to compensate for the 
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added safety. In other words, it is expected that the safer a gameplay round is, the riskier 
the players will behave in the round. How exactly these different levels of safety were im-
plemented is explained in chapter 2.2. 
To summarize the present research, an experiment was conducted which employed a 
video game to answer two main questions. The first question was whether the framing of a 
message that informed about the consequences of behavior (gain-framed vs. loss-framed) 
and the way the message was conveyed (information transfer through text vs. visualization 
of consequences through video) had differing effects on risk behavior. The second question 
was whether making a round of gameplay objectively safer causes players to behave more 
riskily, cancelling out the added safety effect as proposed by Risk Homeostasis Theory 
(Wilde, 1982a).  
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2 Method 
2.1 Participants  
The total number of participants was 178, with 129 of them being female, 44 being 
male and 5 being of unknown gender due to an unfortunate processing error in the ques-
tionnaires used to assess gender. Their age ranged from 18 to 57 years (M=22.4, SD=4.7). All 
participants were either paid for participation or received course credit. 
2.2 The video game and its parameters 
The free software GameMaker 8.1 has been employed to program the game used for 
this study. GameMaker 8.1 features a graphical user-interface designed to aid programming. 
The game itself was programmed to be run in full screen and the actual gameplay was dis-
played in a box with a resolution of 800x600 pixels (width by height). When the used screen 
did not fit this resolution, the unused pixels were filled with a black border around the 
gameplay part of the screen. 
Named SpaceGame, the game featured a 2-dimensional environment with a sprite of 
a small, white spaceship being the controllable element. The objective of the game was to 
steer the ship through an array of incoming meteors, which were also displayed as sprites. 
The sprite for the ship had a size of 90x40 (width by height) pixels and the sprites for the 
meteors had a size of 60x60 pixels. Both the spaceship and the meteors had rectangular col-
lision boxes that fitted their sprite size. The game allowed the ship to be controlled with the 
arrow keys of the keyboard on the y-axis (in the upwards and downwards directions). The 
axis the ship was moving on was positioned 109 pixels away from the left side of the game-
play window. During gameplay, the background image (a schematically displayed city during 
nighttime) was animated to scroll from the right to the left border of the gameplay screen, 
creating the illusion of flight from the perspective of the player. The meteors were generat-
ed at random points on the y-axis at the right side of the gameplay screen and moved to-
wards the ship displayed on the left side. Once generated, the individual meteors never 
changed their elevation and only moved on the x-axis (the horizontal plane). The game fea-
tured 13 difficulty levels, with each difficulty level corresponding to a set speed of the mete-
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ors. The standard speed of the meteors (corresponding to a difficulty setting of 1) was 320 
pixels per second. Using the right arrow key, the player was able to accelerate the ship1 in 13 
difficulty steps of +50 pixels per second up to 920 pixels per second. Holding the right arrow 
key down increased the difficulty level by 1 every 250 milliseconds. Therefore, holding down 
the key served as a means to quickly accelerate while pressing it briefly allowed the player to 
accelerate only slightly, providing easy control over the speed chosen. Complementarily, the 
left arrow key could be used to slow the ship down in the same intervals. In the top-left cor-
ner of the gameplay screen, icons of shields were displayed. Each time the ship collided with 
a meteor, the rightmost shield was depleted and removed from the display. When a collision 
occurred while there were no shields left, the ship was destroyed, which was indicated by an 
animation showing the ship exploding. When this happened, the respective round was over. 
Images of all sprites and an example screenshot of gameplay are found in the appendix. 
While the game was being played, it traced certain gameplay parameters and wrote 
them into a logfile 100 times per second. The parameters logged were: a) the current diffi-
culty level (which could be computed into speed), b) the position of the ship on the y-axis, c) 
the position on both axes of the leftmost meteor sharing any part of its vertical collision box 
with the vertical collision box of the ship and d) the position of the meteor closest to the ship 
on both axes. Parameter c) was logged because it could be used to calculate the time that 
was left until the ship would collide with the meteor currently in its path when it was not 
steered out of the way. Parameter d) was logged because it allowed the calculation of the 
distance between the ship and meteor closest to it. Figure 2 illustrates the parameters 
schematically. Parameter a) is visibly absent from the illustration as it was not displayed in 
the gameplay window but kept track of by the game as an internal variable. 
                                                          
1
 In reality, the meteors accelerated, but as the ship was the controllable element, speeding up the meteors created a very 
believable illusion of a faster flying speed from the ship’s perspective. 
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Figure 2: A schematic illustration of the gameplay screen, with written explanations of the parameters 
that were written into the logfiles. An actual gameplay screenshot can be found in the appendix. 
In addition to these parameters, the logfiles also contained the time the respective 
round took, the number of shields currently active and a unique ID corresponding to the 
currently played round. The logfiles were saved on the hard drive of the computer the game 
was run on in the format .csv, allowing for easy usage with Microsoft Excel and SPSS. Once a 
gameplay session was over, the logfiles could be read by Excel as a table displaying all the 
aforementioned parameters in a line, while each line represented a single writing process, 
meaning that there were 100 lines per second of gameplay with each line containing one 
entry for each parameter. These files were then named steplog.csv and the game placed 
them in a folder named after a number which could be entered in a field at the start of the 
game. 
The steplog data were used to compute the variables that were later used for analy-
sis. Variables that indicated how much risk participants were willing to take were needed 
and three different ones were decided on. The first variable was speed, which is intuitively 
Parameter b): Position of the ship on 
the y-axis 
Parameter c): Position of the leftmost meteor 
sharing any part of its vertical collision box 
with the vertical collision box of the ship. Col-
lision boxes are indicated by the dashed lines. 
SHIP 
METEOR 
Parameter d): Position of the meteor 
closest to the ship 
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related to risk behavior as people choosing higher speeds take more risk of collision – higher 
speeds make it more difficult to react to an incoming meteor in time. The second variable 
was the time that would pass until the collision the ship and a meteor in its path would take 
place if the ship was not steered out of the way. This variable was labeled time to collision 
(TTC) and was assumed to be a measurement for risk behavior as well: since it was always 
calculated with the meteor on collision course with the ship, it served as an indicator for 
how closely participants would let the meteors get to the ship. In this way, a shorter average 
TTC would indicate more willingness to risk a collision. The third and final variable was the 
distance to the closest meteor, which served as an indicator for how closely participants 
would let the meteor fly by the ship. Smaller values indicated meteors coming closer to the 
ship and therefore hinted at the participant taking more risk in their dodging movements. 
The formulae used to compute these variables are displayed below. 
The formula used to compute speed was: 
       (    (              ))      
With difficulty always being a value between 1 and 13 found in the logfiles, this for-
mula yielded speed values between 320 and 920 pixels per second. 
The formula used to compute TTC was: 
    
                             
      
 
The denominator of this formula required speed to already be calculated. This formu-
la is derived from the physical formula used to calculate speed, which has been converted to 
yield TTC instead. The value 109 has to be subtracted from the x-coordinate of the meteor in 
path of the ship as the ship is not displayed at the leftmost side of the screen but 109 pixels 
to the right from it (in other words, if 109 was not subtracted in the nominator, the formula 
would instead yield the time it would take a meteor to collide with the left side of the game-
play screen, at which point it just disappeared). As it is shown here, the formula yielded the 
current time, in seconds, until a collision between the ship and the meteor in its path would 
happen. 
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The formula used to compute the distance to the closest meteor was: 
         √(                        )  (                                        )  
The Pythagorean Theorem was used to create this formula, as the ship and the me-
teor closest to it always formed a triangle with its hypotenuse being the distance between 
the two. As the game measured all distances and positions in pixels, this formula yielded the 
distance between the ship and the meteor closest to it in pixels as well. 
For the experimental manipulation, texts and videos were created. Participants were 
separated into 5 groups. One group served as a text-based control group, two of the groups 
were presented with detailed text-based instructions before playing the game and the two 
final groups were presented with video-based instructions. The titles of the text- and video-
files were never visible to participants during the experiment. The text for the control groups 
only contained very basic information about the key configurations and controls of the 
game. The two texts for the next two groups contained the same information about the con-
trols of the game; however, they differed in their approach to convey the gameplay objec-
tive. Text A, titled AVOID_COLLISION, stressed the need to avoid a collision of the ship with a 
meteor at all costs, describing the consequences of a collision with strong words (example: 
“*…] your ship will be destroyed!”). This text served as a loss-framed instruction. Text B, ti-
tled SMOOTH_RIDE, stressed the need for the ship to have a safe flight without mentioning 
collisions or losses and also conveyed the messages that the shields should not be relied up-
on and that focus should instead be on the ship staying out of danger. This text served as a 
gain-framed instruction. The groups receiving video-based instructions were presented with 
short texts as well, which were read right before the respective instruction-video was 
played. Video A was described before playback as showing consequences of careless and 
risky flying and what to avoid during gameplay. The video itself showed the ship starting 
with 3 shields, accelerating quickly to maximum speed right from the start and repeatedly 
crashing into meteors either in its path or adjacent to it while dodging, ultimately exploding 
on the final collision. This video served as a loss-framed instruction, highlighting the poten-
tial costs of risky behavior. Video B was described before playback as showing desirable fly-
ing behavior. It displayed the ship starting with 3 shields, accelerating slightly (as to not mask 
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the function of accelerating completely from the participants) and dodging all incoming me-
teors as widely as possible. The ship was shown to slow down when there were too many 
meteors in close proximity to it and the video ended after 30 seconds with the ship never 
colliding with a meteor, flying relatively slowly for the entire duration. This video served as a 
gain-framed instruction, highlighting the potential benefits of careful behavior. All five ma-
nipulations were hypothesized to have a different effect on the variables associated with risk 
behavior, with the hypotheses being two-tailed. No assumptions were made about which 
method of conveying the messages would results in a larger effect, as explained in chapter 
1.2. 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested on three consecutive days. Testing was done in a room with 
multiple computers so up to 12 participants could be tested at the same time. The partici-
pants were always spaced apart so that they could not see their neighbors’ screens. The 
game was run on each computer but the main files that the game read from and wrote to 
were saved on a central server instance. Between each of the testing periods, a post-it note 
with a unique participant number was visibly attached to the screen of each computer. Once 
all participants for the testing period had taken their seats, one of the experimenters read a 
short text about the process of the experiment. In this text, it was explained that the objec-
tive of the game was to dodge the meteors and “deliver very valuable cargo”. After hearing 
this information, participants completed the first half of a questionnaire (which was part of a 
different research), proceeded to play the game and completed the second half of the ques-
tionnaire. When a participant started the game up, the game called upon a pre-made, ran-
domized stack file to determine which of the 5 instructions (control, Text A or B, Video A or 
B) should be displayed for this participant. The stack file contained 300 lines, each line with 
numbers corresponding to one of the instructions. As the stack file was saved on a central 
server instance, each time a new participant started the game (on any of the computers) it 
was able to read the topmost unused line and marked it as used afterwards. The numbers in 
the stack file were randomized with the aid of random.org. 
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The gameplay itself always started with a dialog asking participants to fill in their par-
ticipant number as found on the post-it note into a field within the gameplay screen and 
click a button labeled “OK” afterwards. One of the 5 instructions was then displayed with a 
button at the bottom center of the screen labeled “start game”. The instructions always 
ended with the cue that a practice round will precede the real gameplay. Once participants 
read the instruction texts or watched the instruction videos, they pressed the “start game” 
button. This started a practice round, in which participants started with either 1 or 3 shields, 
with the number of shields once again being randomly selected from the stack file. The max-
imum duration of the practice round was 4 minutes. If the ship had lost all shields and was 
destroyed, the round ended prematurely. When participants were able to not destroy the 
ship for 4 minutes of gameplay, an animation of the ship flying into background was dis-
played and the round ended. After the practice round, participants played 5 critical rounds 
of gameplay, with each round lasting a maximum of 4 minutes. The same animation as in the 
practice round was played upon completion of a round. At the start of each of the 5 actual 
rounds, the ship was equipped with 0, 1, 3, 5 or an (to the participants) unknown amount of 
shields. Each of these conditions was played once and their order was once again random-
ized with the aid of the stack file. In case the amount of shields was unknown to the partici-
pant, a white question mark was displayed instead of the shield icons in the top left corner 
of the gameplay screen. In actuality, the number of shields in this condition was always 3. 
Once all gameplay rounds were completed either through lasting 4 minutes each or the ship 
being destroyed, the game displayed a text telling participants to click the “end game” but-
ton, displayed below the text. Once this button was clicked, the game stopped and the se-
cond part of the questionnaire opened for the participants. Once this was finished, the ex-
periment ended and participants received their reward for participation. Once all 178 partic-
ipants had been probed, all folders with logfiles were saved onto a hard drive for further 
analysis. 
The logfiles created by the game, the stack file used for randomization and the for-
mulae described above were used to first create new files for each participant. The new files 
contained the participant number, the instruction received, the amount of shields in the 
practice condition, the amount of shields each critical gameplay round started with in the 
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order they were played in and the time each round including the practice round took overall. 
Also included was the mean speed participants chose for each shield condition and for each 
amount of shields within each condition. As an example, the files contained the mean speed 
that a participant chose between when they started with 3 shields and lost one shield, the 
mean speed for when they then continued with 2 shields until they lost one again, and so 
on. The same was calculated for the speed modus, the minimum speed and the maximum 
speed. TTC was treated much the same way, being calculated for each amount of shields for 
each condition as the mean, median, minimum and maximum TTC. Lastly, the distance to 
the closest meteor was also calculated in this format as mean and minimum. Once such a file 
had been created for each participant, these files were then merged into one big file in 
which the means, minimum and maximum for speed, TTC and distance to the closest meteor 
were calculated for each participant first for each full round (as opposed to each amount of 
shields in each round) and then across the entire game. This file, containing all information 
for all participants, was used for all further analyses. 
2.4 Design 
There were three independent variables in this experiment. Which instruction partic-
ipants had received prior to the experiment was manipulated between subjects in 5 steps, 
while the number of shields a round started with was manipulated within subject in 5 steps. 
Additionally, the number of shields currently left was used as another independent variable 
for a second analysis and was manipulated in 17 steps. Used as dependent variables were 
the mean and maximum speed, mean TTC and mean and minimum distance to the closest 
meteor. To detect possible homeostatic processes, the time each round took was used as a 
dependent variable as well. 
Possible interactions were accounted for by combining the first two independent var-
iables in a single analysis. To avoid a cumulative type-I error, a mixed-factorial ANOVA was 
used for all comparisons. To gain additional insight into how the number of shields currently 
left affects risk behavior, the aforementioned dependent variables (excluding the time each 
round took) were once again analyzed in a within-subject ANOVA with the amount of shields 
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currently left as the independent variable. For all analyses, partial η² is reported as an effect 
size measure where applicable. 
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3 Results 
In the illustrations in figures 3 to 8 in this paragraph, the different instructions are 
displayed as numbers from 1 to 5 to allow for clearer legibility in the graphs. In the following 
table, it is displayed which number corresponds to which instruction. 
Number Instruction 
1 Control 
2 Text AVOID_COLLISION 
3 Text SMOOTH_RIDE 
4 Video AVOID_COLLISION 
5 Video SMOOTH_RIDE 
 
The relation between which instruction participants received, how many shields a 
round started with and the speed they chose is displayed in figures 3 and 4. Descriptively, it 
is obvious that, depending on how many shields the ship was equipped with at the start of a 
round, participants chose a different speed, as the different curves do not lie on top of each 
other. 
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Figure 3: Illustration of the average mean speed chosen by participants as a function of which instruc-
tion was received. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started 
with. 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of the average maximum speed chosen by participants as a function of which 
instruction was received. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds 
started with. 
The mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed that the effect of the number of shields on the 
chosen mean speed was significant, F(4,169)=52.63, p<.001, η²=.556, indicating that mean 
speed differed significantly depending on how many shields a round started with. Post-hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that this difference was significant be-
tween all groups (all p<.05) except for the groups “3 Shields” and “unknown shields” (p=1). 
The effect of the instructions on the mean speed turned out to be non-significant, 
F(4,172)=2.04, n.s, indicating that mean speed was not significantly affected by which in-
struction participants had received. Additionally, the interaction between instruction and 
number of shields for mean speed also turned out to be non-significant, F(16,688)=1.3, n.s.. 
The data showed a comparable trend for maximum speed. The effect of the number 
of shields on the chosen maximum speed was significant, F(4,169)=2.93, p=.022, η²=.065, 
indicating that maximum speed differed significantly depending on the number of shields a 
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round started with. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that this 
difference was only significant between the groups “0 Shields” and “1 Shield” (p=.038). 
Again, the effect of the instructions on the maximum speed was non-significant, 
F(4,172)=2.103, n.s., so maximum speed was not affected by which instruction participants 
had received. The interaction between instruction and number of shields also was not signif-
icant, F(16,688)=1.03, n.s.. 
In figure 5, the relation between which instruction participants received, how many 
shields a round started with and TTC is displayed. As with speed, the curves differ visibly de-
pending on how many shields the ship had. 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the average mean TTC participants had as a function of which instruction was 
received. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started with. 
The data for mean TTC exhibited a similar trend as the data for mean speed did. The 
mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the number of shields on mean TTC, 
F(4,169)=101.327, p<.001, η²=.706. Therefore, the number of shields a round started with 
significantly influenced the mean TTC. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons again 
revealed that this difference was significant between all groups (all p<.05) except for the 
groups “3 Shields” and “unknown shields”. Once again, the effect of the instructions on the 
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mean TTC turned out to be non-significant, F(4,172)=2.085, n.s., rendering this manipulation 
ineffective here as well. The same not significant result was found for the interaction be-
tween instruction and number of shields, F(16,688)=1.625, n.s.. 
In figures 6 and 7, the mean and minimum distances to the closest meteor are dis-
played in relation to the number of shields a round started with and which instruction partic-
ipants had received. Although the curves are closer together for this measurement, they still 
differ visibly. 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of the average mean distance to the closest meteor participants had as a function 
of which instruction was received. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the 
rounds started with. 
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Figure 7: Illustration of the average minimum distance to the closest meteor participants had as a func-
tion of which instruction was received. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields 
the rounds started with. 
For the results concerning the distance to the closest meteor, the mixed-factorial 
ANOVA revealed that the effect of the number of shields on the mean distance to the closest 
meteor was significant, F(4,169)=35.351, p<.001, η²=.456, indicating a significant influence of 
the number of shields a round started with on mean distance to the closest meteor. Post-
hoc, Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed the same trend as for mean speed and 
mean TTC, with all groups differing significantly (all p<.05) except for the groups “3 Shields” 
and “unknown shields” (p=.509). Once again, the effect of the instructions on mean distance 
to the closest meteor was not significant, F(4,172)=.0613, n.s. and the same was found for 
the interaction between instructions and number of shields on distance to the closest mete-
or, F(16,688)=.963, n.s.. For the minimum distance to the closest meteor, the effect of the 
number of shields a round started with was also significant, F(4,169)=39.702, p<.001, 
η²=.483. Post-hoc, Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed significant differences be-
tween the group “0 Shields” and all other groups (all p<.01), significant differences between 
the group “1 Shield” and all other groups (all p<.01) and no significant differences between 
the groups “3 Shields”, “5 Shields” and “unknown shields” (all p>.05). The effect of the in-
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structions on minimum distance to the closest meteor was not significant, F(4,172)=1.745, 
n.s. and the same result was yielded for the interaction between instructions and number of 
shields on minimum distance to the closest meteor, F(16,688)=.541, n.s.. 
The relation between the time each round took and the number of shields each 
round started with and which instruction participants had received is displayed in figure 8. 
Figure 8: Illustration of the average time each round took as a function of which instruction was re-
ceived. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started with. 
For this measurement, the mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
the number of shields a round started with on time, F(4,169)=72.116, p<.001, η²=.629. Post-
hoc, Bonferroni-corrected comparisons showed that this difference was significant between 
all groups (all p<.001) except between the groups “3 Shields” and “unknown shields” (p=1). 
When taking the graphs in figure 8 into consideration, these results indicate that the more 
shields a round started with, the longer it took, which should be inferentially expected. The 
effect of the instructions on the time once again turned out to be non-significant, 
F(4,172)=1.917, n.s., as did the interaction between instructions and number of shields, 
F(16,688)=.713, n.s.. 
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The next figures display the results of the within-subject analysis that concerns the 
number of shields left at any point. In figure 9, the relation between the current number of 
shields and average mean speed is displayed. 
Figure 9: Illustration of the average mean speed as a function of how many shields the participants had 
left. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started with. 
Descriptively, it is visible that the start of each round (when no shields were lost 
yet) differs from the rest of the respective round along with the non-starting shields of the 
other rounds. In other words, all first shields of all rounds seem to form a group that differs 
from the other shields, which also seem to form a group. The statistical comparisons confirm 
just that, with one outlier that warrants further discussion. The within-subject ANOVA re-
vealed a significant effect of the amount of shields left on mean speed, F(16,2832)=50.731, 
p<.001, η²=.306. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed the trend just de-
scribed: The first shield of each round differed significantly from both the other shields of its 
own round as well as the non-starting shields of the other rounds (all p<.05). When taking 
figure 9 into consideration, this indicates that mean speed was significantly lower within the 
first shield of each round compared to the rest of the round. No significant differences 
emerged between the rest of the data points once one shields was depleted (all p>.05), with 
an exception found in the “unknown shields” round: When participants had two shields left 
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
5 4 3 2 1 0
M
e
an
 s
p
e
e
d
 in
 p
ix
e
ls
/s
e
co
n
d
 
Number of shields left 
0 Shields
1 Shield
3 Shields
5 Shields
unknown shields
An investigation of risk compensation and the influence of gain-framed and loss-framed messages on risk behavior in a laboratory-based video game experiment 31 
 
in this round (after their first collision), their speed increased significantly compared to when 
all shields were intact in this round and in the other rounds (all p<.05), however, this specific 
condition (unknown shields, after the first collision) also differed significantly from the rest 
of the “unknown shields” round (both p<.05), meaning that mean speed increased even fur-
ther after a second shield was lost in the “unknown shields” round. Furthermore, the condi-
tion in question did not differ significantly from any other condition (all p>.05). 
Figure 10 shows the relation between the current number of shields and the aver-
age maximum speed chosen by participants. 
Figure 10: Illustration of the average maximum speed as a function of how many shields the participants 
had left. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started with. 
The data for average maximum speed do not show as clear of a trend as the data 
for average mean speed. Descriptively, an increase in maximum speed is displayed after the 
first shield of each round is lost, while maximum speed declines continuously after that 
point. The within-subject ANOVA revealed a significant effect of how many shields were left 
on maximum speed, F(16,2832)=6.005, p<.001, η²=.034. The effect size calculated for this 
result is considered small. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed that the dif-
ferences between the first shield and the second shield in each round were never significant 
(all p>.05), except for the “unknown shields” round, were maximum speed increased signifi-
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cantly after the first shield was lost (p=.038). The rest of the values in the “unknown shields” 
round did not differ significantly from each other (all p>.05). For the other rounds, significant 
differences did not emerge between shields in succession; however, the following differ-
ences were found to be significant: the last two shields of the “5 Shields” round differed sig-
nificantly from both each other and the rest of the shields in this round (all p<.05), the “0 
Shields” round differed significantly from the first three shields of the “5 Shields” round and 
from the second shield of the “3 Shields” round (all p<.05). The second shield of the “5 
Shields” round differed significantly from the first shield of the “3 Shields” round (p=.025). 
In figure 11, the relation between the amount of shields left and average mean TTC 
is displayed. Descriptively, it is very similar to figure 9 (mean speed). 
 
Figure 11: Illustration of the average mean TTC as a function of how many shields the participants had 
left. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the rounds started with. 
The data for mean TTC exhibited a trend comparable to those for mean speed. The 
within-subject ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the number of shields left on mean 
TTC, F(16,2832)=75.8, p<.001, η²=.397. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons con-
firmed the visual description of the data, with significant differences emerging between the 
first shield of every round (before a collision) and the rest of the shields both within the 
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same round and the non-starting shields of the other rounds (all p<.05). In other words, just 
like for mean speed, the first shields of each respective round formed a group differing sig-
nificantly from both the other shields in their respective group and the other shields in all 
other groups. In contrast to what was found for mean speed, there were no outliers in the 
data for TTC that differed from this trend. 
The relation between the number of shields left and the mean distance to the clos-
est meteor is displayed in figure 12. Again, this variable visibly exhibited the same trend as 
mean speed and mean TTC. 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of the average mean distance to the closest meteor as a function of how many 
shields the participants had left. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the 
rounds started with. 
The results of the within-subject ANOVA once again confirmed the visible impres-
sion that the data convey: The number of shields left had a significant effect on the mean 
distance to the closest meteor, F(16,2832)=86.593, p<.001, η²=.43. Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc comparisons showed significant differences between the first shields of each round 
compared to the other shields, both of the respective round and the other rounds (all 
p<.05), with all other differences being non-significant (all p>.05). Worded differently, the 
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first shields of each round formed a group that differed significantly from the group formed 
by all other shields. 
The next figure shows the relation between the minimum distance to the closest 
meteor and the number of shields currently left. The trend observed in the data so far is 
once again visible here, although not quite as clearly. For minimum distance to the closest 
meteor, the values generally become smaller as the round proceeds, indicating that with the 
progression of the round, participants dodged the meteors more closely than at the begin-
ning of the round. 
 
Figure 13: Illustration of the average minimum distance to the closest meteor as a function of how many 
shields the participants had left. Differently colored graphs are used for the different amount of shields the 
rounds started with. 
The within-subject ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the number of shields left 
on the average minimum distance to the closest meteor, F(16,2832)=52.218, p<.001, 
η²=.232. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons once again showed significant differ-
ences between the first shields of each round and the other shields of both the respective 
round and the other rounds (all p<.05), meaning that the first shields of each round once 
again formed a group differing significantly from a group formed by all other shields. In addi-
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tion, significant differences emerged between the second shield of the “5 Shields” round and 
the second to last and last shield of the same round (both p<.005), between the third shield 
of the “5 Shields” round and the last shield of the same round (p=.005) and between the 
second and the last shield of the “unknown shields” round (p=.01). 
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4 Discussion 
The aim of the present experiment was twofold. A video game featuring a spaceship 
dodging obstacles in flight was programmed to measure and log parameters of risk behavior 
during gameplay. The first objective was to investigate the influence of gain-framed and loss-
framed messages conveying the consequences of behavior on risk behavior. Both types of 
messages were presented either as a text or as a combination of a text and a video, with the 
assumption that the text-video combination would differ from the text-only instructions in 
their effects on risk behavior as the video directly demonstrated the consequences of a cer-
tain behavior, while the text merely described it, but required more concentration to active-
ly process. The second objective was to test the mechanisms of risk compensation as pro-
posed by Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1982a). This was realized by setting up multiple 
gameplay rounds with varying amounts of objective safety: through the introduction of 
shields that protected the spaceship in case it hit an obstacle, having more shields was natu-
rally safer. In line with RHT, it was hypothesized that participants will change their flying be-
havior to be more risky when the ship is equipped with more shields, ultimately cancelling 
out the added safety by taking more risk. This is because RHT proposes that people are char-
acterized by a desire to experience a certain degree of safety and that this specific degree is 
not changed by making actions inherently safer. This was investigated further by analyzing 
whether or not participants adjusted their behavior depending on how many shields they 
had left in a round. 
The results of the experiment showed support only for one of the two proposed ef-
fects. Generally speaking, the idea that gain-framed or loss-framed messages have an effect 
on risk behavior was not supported. However, the amount of shields (and therefore, the 
amount of objective safety) in a round did have a significant influence on the measurements 
used here to assess risk behavior. 
The finding that the type of instruction participants had received did not influence 
risk behavior has some implications. It is imaginable that the way the instructions were con-
veyed (either through text or through text + video) was simply not strong enough to trigger a 
response in risk behavior. This might have been due to weaker formulations in the texts or 
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due to the behavior shown in the videos not being shown in extreme enough manners. Nev-
ertheless, the graphs in figures 3, 4, 5 and 8 do show a trend of the two video-based groups 
(groups 4 and 5) differing in risk behavior and although no p-values reached statistical signif-
icance, they came very close to in the case of the difference between the two video-based 
groups. This notion points towards the sample size in the current experience being too small; 
while the differences between the other groups are questionable, statistically significant 
differences may have emerged between the two video-based groups with a larger overall 
sample. Should such differences emerge, however, they should be interpreted with caution. 
It might be that the group that is shown careful behavior exhibits this behavior not because 
its value is highlighted but simply because careful behavior was made more salient by show-
ing this video. A comparable mechanism is of course imaginable for the group where the 
avoidance of risky behavior is highlighted: By showing this behavior, it becomes more salient 
for participants, therefore they engage in it regardless of being warned not to behave as 
shown. Such a finding would also mean that showing undesirable behavior together with the 
instruction that is should not be exhibited is ineffective in suppressing that behavior as it 
only increases its salience. While the present data do not support these hypotheses quanti-
tatively, they do show a trend pointing into their direction. If future research reveals the 
findings described here, they should be interpreted with caution and maybe tested for with-
out using gameplay rounds of different objective safety. 
Fortunately, the present data did allow for inferences about the influence of added 
safety on risk behavior. Depending on how many shields they started a round with, partici-
pants played the game more riskily, with a higher number of shields leading to higher mean 
speed, lower TTC values and lower distances to the closest meteor. Although not all de-
pendent variables showed the exact same tendency in differences between the groups, all 
results point into the same direction. 
The differences found in mean speed seem to be very much in line with the notion of 
risk compensation. The more shields a round started with, the faster participants flew the 
ship on average, meaning that they compensated for the added safety by behaving in a riski-
er fashion, with differences being significant between all groups except for two (this finding 
will be discussed in detail below). The differences found in maximum speed are less pro-
An investigation of risk compensation and the influence of gain-framed and loss-framed messages on risk behavior in a laboratory-based video game experiment 38 
 
nounced than the ones in mean speed, with significant differences emerging only between 
two groups. This might be because maximum speed was only exhibited during a few mo-
ments of gameplay, likely when participants tried out how fast they can go, probably during 
the beginning of a round when the number of meteors on the screen has not reached its 
maximum yet. Overall, maximum speed might not be as valid as a measurement of risk be-
havior as mean speed is, as mean speed takes the entire data of one gameplay round into 
consideration. This idea is supported by the fact that for maximum speed, only the groups “0 
Shields” and “1 Shield” differed significantly, which are not at opposite ends of the spectrum 
of the number of shields possible, but quite close to each other. This makes the validity of 
maximum speed as a measurement of risk behavior in this experiment very questionable. 
Regardless, the data for mean speed clearly support the notion that people adjust their risk 
behavior depending on how objectively safe the situation is, which is in line with the me-
chanics for RHT proposed by Wilde (1982a). 
The data for mean TTC in the mixed-factorial ANOVA exhibited a trend comparable to 
mean speed. Once again, the higher the number of shields was, the lower the mean TTC for 
the respective round was, indicating that on average, participants let meteors get closer to 
the ship before dodging out of the way when the round had started with more shields. Just 
like the finding before, this one also points towards risk compensation, as participants com-
pensated for safer circumstances by putting the ship in more dangerous situations. Even 
though this finding seems to confirm the first one, it should be interpreted with caution: As 
the formula used to calculate TTC necessarily needed to include the current speed, TTC 
changed depending on which speed participants chose, so the two measurements might be 
interrelated to a large extend. Additionally, TTC was always calculated with the meteor in 
path of the ship - which meteor that was changed quicker depending on how fast partici-
pants were able to react, which was again dependent on speed. Faster speed of course 
brings the ship closer to the object on collision course than slower speed before a dodging 
reaction can take place (assuming equal reaction times). Considering these notions, it is im-
aginable that TTC is, in this case, not a highly valid measurement for risk behavior, as it de-
pends too much on speed in the two ways just described. 
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For the mean distance to the closest meteor, the findings were once again compara-
ble to mean speed (and mean TTC), as all groups differed except for two. The direction of 
this difference was once again in line with risk compensation: The higher the number of 
shields was, the lower the mean distance to the closest meteor was, indicating that partici-
pants once again compensated for a safer situation by bringing the ship closer to the objects 
it could collide with. These differences were, once again, significant between all groups ex-
cept for two. The findings for minimum distance to the closest meteor were not as clear-cut. 
Significant differences emerged between the group “0 Shields” and all other groups and the 
group “1 Shield” and all other groups, with no additional differences found. Taking the 
graphs in figure 7 into consideration, it is clear that the direction of these differences is in 
line with risk compensation, as the “0 Shields” group has the lowest minimal distance to the 
closest meteor while the group “1 Shield” had the second lowest. The fact that no difference 
emerged between the other groups might indicate that minimum and mean distance to the 
closest meteor both measure different aspects of risk behavior (or measure different things 
altogether). Minimum distance to the closest meteor is far more heavily influence by very 
short moments in time where a single meteor is dodged closely than mean distance to the 
closest meteor is. Of course, these near-misses are the moments of the most imminent dan-
ger, meaning that they might be even more valid measurements for risk taking behavior, as 
average minimum distance to the closest meteor becomes smaller the more near-misses 
participants produce. However, having a small number of shields might also increase nerv-
ousness and therefore impair concentration, artificially increasing the number of near-
misses. As the data do not allow controlling for this potential influence, mean distance to the 
closest meteor should be viewed as a more valid measurement for risk behavior in the con-
text of this experiment. 
Finally, the results concerning the time each round took are both surprising and not. 
Not surprising is the finding that the more shields a round started with, the longer it took, 
which is to be expected as more shields mean more buffers that protect against the destruc-
tion of the ship, extending the time that the round can be played for before the ship is de-
stroyed. The surprising finding is that this is not in line with RHT: RHT would have predicted 
equal times for each round irrespective of the number of shields, as shields do not increase 
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the participants’ desire to be safe, therefore they should have no effect on overall time of 
the gameplay rounds. RHT would have predicted a compensation for the added safety that is 
so complete that each round ends in fatal destruction after the exact same amount of time, 
irrespective of the number of shields. A complete compensation according to RHT would 
mean that crashes occur more often with a higher number of shields, keeping the time after 
which a fatality (the destruction of the ship, which would equal to the death of a driver in 
real traffic) constant. 
Unfortunately, the results of the within-subject ANOVA that had the number of 
shields currently left as the independent variable seriously challenge the results of the 
mixed-factorial ANOVA. The results for mean speed, mean TTC and mean distance to the 
closest meteor all show the same trend: In each round, the first shield differs significantly 
from the rest of the shields in both the same round and in the other rounds. The first shield 
in each round also does not differ significantly from the first shields in the other rounds. For 
mean speed, mean TTC and mean distance to the closest meteor, these findings point to-
wards two different systematic errors in the data gathering method employed here. As men-
tioned, the ship always started each round with the minimum possible speed of 320 pixels 
per second. As the logging of the data started right at the beginning of a round and logging 
happened 100 times per second, the first few hundreds of data points had the minimum 
possible value of speed, before participants started to speed up. Because of the way means 
are calculated and the fact that they are very vulnerable to outliers, the first few seconds of 
each round act as a huge bias in the data that only affect the first shield of each round. In 
other words, the fact that each round started with the minimum possible speed systemati-
cally decreased the mean speed and mean TTC for the first shield of each round drastically. 
The same is true for mean distance to the closest meteor, albeit for a different reason. When 
each round started, there were no meteors on the screen. The first meteor was generated as 
soon as the round started (with all subsequent meteors being generated at a fixed time in-
terval, as described in chapter 2.2); however, as new meteors were always generated on the 
right side of the gameplay screen while the ship was positioned towards the left, the meteor 
closest to the ship was actually much further away from it in the beginning of each new 
round than it was during normal gameplay, when the screen was always filled with a set 
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number of meteors. This introduces a systematic bias much like the initial speed of each 
round does: Because the distance to the closest meteor was much higher than usual at the 
beginning of each round, it is systematically higher within the first shield of each round as 
well. These biases are problematic for the mixed-factorial ANOVA results as well. The means 
for the dependent variables used in the mixed-factorial ANOVA were calculated across on 
entire round. Because the data for the first shield of each round were affected by the bias 
described, they also heavily affected the mean data for the entire round and therefore also 
affected the differences between the rounds. As an example, grand means for the “5 Shields” 
round were not as heavily affected by the first shield as the grand means for the “1 Shield” 
round were because the “5 Shields” round had much more additional data (through having 4 
more shields) to “counteract” or “outweigh” the initial bias of the start of the round. This 
scheme can of course be applied to the differences between the other rounds as well and 
unfortunately also explains the fact that no differences emerged between the “3 Shields” 
and “unknown shields” rounds very well, as they effectively had the same number of shields. 
This bias seriously calls all conclusions drawn from the results of the mixed-factorial ANOVA 
into question, making the ones for mean speed, mean TTC and mean distance to the closest 
meteor essentially non-interpretable; however, the means for maximum speed and mini-
mum distance to the closest meteor cannot have fallen victim to this bias, as the values they 
produced in the very beginning of each round did not affect the final data. They therefore 
need to be investigated separately. The next paragraph will list possible explanations for the 
findings concerning mean speed, mean TTC and mean distance to the closest meteor, ac-
counting for the bias. 
Fortunately, as only the first shield of each round is systematically biased, the results 
of the within-subject ANOVA for the other shields of each round are interpretable in relation 
to each other. However, it quickly becomes clear that for mean speed, mean TTC and mean 
distance to the closest meteor, there are no differences between the shields after the first 
one at all with only one exception for mean speed within the “unknown shields” round. This 
means that risk compensation is completely absent for these three dependent variables, as 
participants did not adjust their mean speed, did not show a change in TTC and did not fly 
further away from the meteors on average when the round became objectively less safe. 
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However, this does not mean that these data disprove RHT: As there was no risk compensa-
tion found for these variables, the participants’ desire for safety seemed to be unaffected 
and, as a matter of fact, seemed to be the only thing dictating their risk behavior. In other 
words, for mean speed, mean TTC and mean distance to the closest meteor, instead of ad-
justing their risk behavior accounting for the degree of objective safety, participants seemed 
to be guided by an “inner safety compass”, not taking the situation they found themselves 
into account and instead relying on their own desire for safety to asses which speed to 
choose and how closely to dodge the meteors. Wilde (1982a) proposes that peoples’ inner 
desire for safety, in the long run, is the only thing that their risk behavior adapts to, which is 
seemingly in line with this interpretation of the present results. This interpretation must, 
however, be viewed with caution, as the concept of a desire for safety in a laboratory setting 
with the absence of real danger is at least questionable, as pointed out in chapter 1.1 al-
ready. The outlier found in the trend of the data within the “unknown shields” round is an 
interesting additional finding: The second shield in this round differs significantly from the 
second to last and last shields, albeit only for mean speed and not for mean TTC or mean 
distance to the closest meteor. This is puzzling, as in the absence of any visible information 
about the objective safety of a round, participants still adjusted their risk behavior towards a 
value that is comparable to the value of the last shields of the other rounds. However, this 
adaption is slower when compared to the other rounds. One possible explanation is that, in 
the absence of information about objective safety, the starting speed of a round serves as a 
behavioral “anchor” that participants initially use as an orientation, but once they start los-
ing shields and realize that the “unknown shields” round has more than 0 or 1 shields, the 
anchor stops having an effect and participants instead once again rely on their own desire to 
be safe, regardless of the true, objective safety level being invisible to them all throughout 
the round. This strengthens the assumption that while after some time the objective safety 
level ceases to matter, with participants’ inner desire for safety taking over, but that at least 
initially, the level of objective safety seems to be taken into consideration as long as it is not 
visible. 
For maximum speed, a general trend that could be observed was that after the first 
shield in each round was depleted, the average maximum speed increased, only to decrease 
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back down for every additional shield lost during the respective round. Statistically, not all 
differences in this trend emerged as significant and only the “5 Shields” round showed clear-
ly interpretable results: When left with 4 shields in the “5 Shields” round, participants had a 
significantly higher maximum speed than when they had only 1 or 0 shields left in the same 
round. This is the first unbiased result that clearly points towards direct risk compensation: 
As the round continues, it becomes more and more objectively unsafe through the loss of 
shields and participants adjust their maximum speed to lower levels. This finding contrasts 
with the ones for mean speed as actual compensation for the objective safety of a round can 
be found here. The fact that participants showed lower maximum speeds towards the end of 
the round might indicate a different mechanic of risk behavior: in real-life traffic situations, 
the moments were maximum speed is driven at are the ones where most accidents can be 
expected to happen, while driving at average speed is inherently safer. It can be inferred 
that, in the present experiment, participants increased their own safety not by slowing down 
on average, but by reducing the maximum speed they were willing to fly at once the level of 
objective safety in a round decreased and the danger of a “fatal” crash became more and 
more imminent. As moments of maximum speed are the most dangerous in real-life traffic 
as well, this finding supports the notion that there is risk compensation in specific areas 
(such as maximum speed), but not overall. 
The data for minimum distance to the closest meteor show a trend that is very puz-
zling at first. Overall, the minimum distance becomes smaller as the round continues, which 
means that the less objectively safe the round becomes, the closer participants came to the 
meteors in at least one occasion. In other words, during a few short moments for each 
round, participants took more risk the more unsafe the round was. Upon further investiga-
tion, it was revealed that the entire data for minimum distance to the closest meteor are 
heavily biased as well. As average minimum distance was only ever calculated with the 
smallest value found for each shield and then averaged across all participants for this shield, 
it is very susceptible to numerical outliers as well. In the moment of a collision, the minimum 
distance to the closest meteor has a value of 0 by definition, meaning that for all events of a 
collision, the respective participant had 0 as their minimum distance for this shield. What 
this essentially means is that for every collision that happened to a participant, the average 
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minimum distance for this specific shield was biased more towards zero. The downward 
trend in the data can be explained as follows: a few participants were always able to finish 
the rounds with a certain number of shields intact, meaning that they, for example, only lost 
2 shields in the “5 Shields” round before the round automatically ended after 4 minutes. For 
these participants, the minimum distance for the rest of the round was, by definition, a miss-
ing value. This means that the less shields were left, the less participants actually came this 
far down in their number of shields, meaning that each collision that resulted in a distance 
value of 0 affected the means more the further into a round it happened. To give an exam-
ple using the “5 Shields” round: there were less participants who had 1 shield left than there 
were participants with 4 shields left at any point of the round, meaning that a collision and 
therefore a distance value of 0 had a higher mathematical “weight” for the calculations for 1 
shield (left) because these calculations were done with less overall data points than the ones 
for 4 shields. Because of this bias, minimum distance to the closest meteor should not be 
used as a measurement for short moments of maximally risky behavior at all in the context 
of this experiment. A better alternative for future studies would be to use the bottom 5% of 
distance values for calculations, greatly reducing the impact that values of 0 caused by colli-
sions have on the means. 
One highly interesting finding of the present experiment, taking the results of the 
within-subject ANOVA into consideration specifically, is that for all dependent variables 
(speed, TTC and distance to the closest meteor), almost no differences emerged between 
the groups “3 Shields” and “unknown shields”. As mentioned in chapter 2.3, there was no 
way for the participants to tell how many shields the ship was equipped with in the “un-
known shields” round, which is why it was expected that participants would treat this round 
similar to the “0 Shields” condition – as there was no way to reliably assess the amount of 
safety in this round, the logical way to play this round would be to fly as slowly and carefully 
as possible. However, the data show another trend: Even though participants did not know 
that the amount of shields in the “unknown shields” round was always 3, they still exhibited 
behavior that did not differ significantly from the behavior they exhibited in the “3 Shields” 
round. This finding is puzzling, as risk compensation requires the amount of perceived risk to 
be assessed accurately, which was not possible in the “unknown shields” round. While the 
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safest assumption would be to assume 0 shields and no protection, participants did not be-
have this way. A possible (but very frightening) explanation for this is in line with RHT: even 
when the objective safety of a situation is unknown, the amount of risk people are willing to 
take is unaffected, causing them to make assumptions about the situation based on nothing 
and therefore showing a certain level of risk behavior that is much closer to the amount of 
risk they are willing to take than to the amount of risk they should be taking. People assum-
ing a safety level that is a lot higher than their information allows them to has large implica-
tions for road safety: Not knowing the amount of risk (because of, for example, “invisible” 
risk factors such as very thin ice on the road) might cause people to assume that there is no 
risk instead of assuming a moderate or maximum amount of risk. The present data seem to 
point in the direction that when faced with an unknown amount of safety, people seem to 
treat it like an “average” amount of safety (in the context of this experiment, the mean 
amount of shields across all rounds was close to 3), which is not as detrimental as assuming 
absolute safety / no risk, but certainly not optimal. However, there is another possible ex-
planation for this finding that does not shed such a bad light on humans’ ability to assess 
risk: although people did not know how many shields the ship had, they might have been 
implicitly able to tell the approximate amount based on the amount of collisions that took 
place in that gameplay round, making their judgment implicitly more accurate than allowed 
by the displayed information. From this point of view, it could be inferred the assessment of 
risk in a given situation is not a conscious process that only takes in visible information, but is 
instead a more complex, subconscious process that takes all available information into ac-
count and therefore is a lot more precise than initially assumed. This notion is supported by 
the fact that for mean speed, the second shields of the “3 Shields” and “unknown shields” 
round differed, but towards the end of both rounds, mean speed shifted towards a common 
value. This might indicate that, the more a round progresses, the more accurate the implicit 
risk assessment becomes. Future experiments could test which of these two assumptions is 
true by changing the amount of shields that the “unknown shields” round starts with while 
keeping the other rounds the same. For example, when the amount of shields in the “un-
known shields” condition is 5, do the curves for the dependent variables suddenly no longer 
differ between “5 Shields” and “unknown shields”, or do they not change compared to the 
present experiment? The former would indicate a mechanic of risk and safety assessment 
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that is implicit and depends on much more than only visible information. The latter would 
mean that risk assessment in case of no visible information “defaults” to a value that is 
roughly the same as the mean amount of safety across all rounds. Both explanations would 
have implications for traffic safety: The first one would indicate that providing as much in-
formation (visible and non-visible) as possible about the current risk level is beneficial and 
aids people in assessing the amount of objective risk correctly, the second one would indi-
cate that information should be given that artificially increases the amount of perceived risk 
to deter people from assuming a “default” risk. However, if RHT is true in its entirety, then 
both approaches would yield no changes in fatality rates in the long run as both do not affect 
drivers’ desire to be safe. 
To provide further clarity on the mechanics of risk assessment in this type of experi-
ment, the amount of shields in the “unknown shields” condition could be made unlimited – 
is it possible that keeping participants in a constant state of not knowing their safety could 
reveal a “true” equilibrium of risk behavior that they shift towards. However, if participants 
are implicitly able to tell that their shields are unlimited (which they could reasonably as-
sume after a large number of collisions), they might just speed up to maximum speed for the 
remainder of the round without fear of consequences. Again, both findings would have dif-
ferent implications for risk assessment in the context of this experiment. The emergence of 
an equilibrium (in speed, TTC and distance to the closest meteor) would indicate that there 
is indeed an internal level of perceived risk that participants are not willing to go over. In 
contrast, a constant increase in speed up to the maximum would either indicate that partici-
pants are (implicitly) able to tell that that their shields are unlimited, or that every collision is 
viewed as evidence that there are more shields than initially assumed, justifying a speedup. 
The latter would be highly counterproductive, as even with unknown shields, losing a shield 
logically means that the risk of destruction is now greater than it was before the shield was 
lost. Overall, the “unknown shields” round and its comparison with the other rounds are the 
key to discovering the mechanics of risk assessment in the context of this and comparable 
experiments, and perhaps even in real traffic situations. 
Another point regarding the present experiment that warrants discussion is the pos-
sible anchor effect of the initial speed that each round started with. As indicated in chapter 
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2.2, the maximum possible speed was 920 pixels per second, which participants did not 
seem to speed up to. There are two possible explanations for this: Participants might have 
no longer felt comfortable in their ability to safely dodge the meteors once they flew faster 
than a certain speed, so they stuck with a speed lower than that. This is reasonable, as at 
maximum speed, the game was indescribably difficult to play safely even for the very experi-
enced developers. Alternatively, it is possible that the speed each round started with served 
as an anchor for the speed that participants felt they were “supposed” to play the game at. 
As every round started with the minimum speed of 320 pixels per second, this anchor is very 
low. Future experiments should investigate the potential anchoring effect of initial speed by 
either setting the beginning speed of each round to the maximum speed (920 pixels per se-
cond) or by randomizing the speed at which a round starts. If significantly higher average 
speeds are found in an experiment that lets the ship start with the maximum speed, an an-
choring effect of initial speed on subsequent behavior can be inferred. If there is such an 
anchor effect, the range of speed chosen should increase with the introduction of random-
ized starting speed. If there is no anchor effect, both findings just described should not ap-
pear in subsequent data. Another possibility would be to let the rounds start with a speed of 
0 pixels per second and to allow participants to speed up from a dead stop. In order to avoid 
the data bias described earlier, logging should only start once participants have dodged at 
least one meteor, as this would require them to have sped up and would have required the 
game to have generated enough meteors that one of them has already become a danger. 
This experiment implies, albeit only through one variable, that risk compensation is 
real in situations of imminent danger (as implied by the changes found in maximum speed). 
It was shown that an increased amount of perceived safety causes people to adapt their be-
havior to be more risky, but only during very short, exceptionally dangerous moments. How-
ever, this increase in risky behavior did not cause a higher number of fatalities within the 
same timeframe, making true homeostatic processes doubtful. It is entirely possible that, as 
predicted by Wilde (1982a), homeostatic processes take considerable time to emerge, so the 
very limited timespan that the game was played in might have been too short to detect risk 
homeostasis. The fact that risk compensation has been shown in this experiment is further 
evidence for the limited usefulness of safety precautions in all sorts of applications as they 
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might very well be compensated for by humans. Although homeostasis failed to show up in 
this experiment, the proposal made by Wilde that only a change in the amount of risk people 
are willing to take can truly affect the rate of incidents might still very well be true. Future 
research in this regard should try to manipulate the amount of risk people are willing to take 
before the experiment to see if a difference in, for example, speed emerges. As showing 
people the consequences of risky behavior has not succeeded in influencing neither partici-
pants’ willingness to take risk nor their risk behavior in this experiment, another approach is 
needed. As mentioned already, maybe the way the consequences of behavior were shown in 
the videos for this experiment was not strong enough – as humans are social and empathic 
beings, maybe showing a video of a person playing the game, crashing the ship and being 
visibly upset about it has a stronger effect on willingness to take risk, as people want to 
avoid feeling like the person they have just been shown. The inverse might be true for show-
ing a person playing carefully and enjoying the game without taking risks. Again, the poten-
tial pitfall in this process lies in a possible anchor effect of the behavior shown: instead of 
influencing the amount of risk people are willing to take, the manipulation just makes a way 
to play the game more salient, increasing the chance of it being replicated. This could be 
circumvented by increasing the salience of consequences of behavior in a context that is not 
comparable to the experiment, for example by showing accidents or safe behavior in traffic 
or in another domain. This approach could increase or decrease the observer’s general de-
sire for safety without making a certain way to play the game more salient. The fact that this 
type of manipulation needs to be of sufficient strength is evidenced by the fact that the dif-
ferences in the dependent variables, although all non-significant, are visibly larger between 
the two video-based groups than between the text-based or control groups. 
The present experiment did not test for the influence of psychophysiological arousal 
in the context of risk-taking. Future experiments should aim to uncover if moments of max-
imal risk (for example, close dodges or near-misses) cause a response in, for example, skin 
conductance or hormonal balance to see if higher arousal can be measured in these mo-
ments. As discussed in chapter 1.1, this procedure might shed light on whether taking risks is 
related to a “target level” of psychophysiological arousal and might therefore, for all practi-
cal intents and purposes, exist for its own sake rather than for external utility. 
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Overall, this thesis discussed Risk Homeostasis Theory as introduced by Wilde in 
1982, its proposed mechanics with a focus on risk compensation and the theory of gain- and 
loss-framed messages with their respective potential influence on behavior. The aim of the 
presented experiment was to uncover possible effects of gain- and loss-framed messages 
about consequences of actions on risk behavior and to investigate the mechanics of risk 
compensation as described in Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1982a). This was realized in 
an experiment that featured a controllable spaceship that had to be steered safely, without 
contact, through a field of approaching meteors. The game traced and logged the speed of 
the ship, the time it would take the ship to collide with a meteor in its path if it is not steered 
out of the way and the distance to the closest meteor during gameplay. These parameters 
were assumed to be indicators of the amount of risk people were willing to take. The game 
was played over multiple rounds and each round started with a different number of shields 
that prevented the ship from being destroyed in case of a collision – therefore, a higher 
number of shields meant a higher amount of objective safety. In accordance with the me-
chanic of risk compensation proposed in RHT, participants compensated for added safety by 
behaving more riskily, but only during short moments where their speed was maximized and 
not during the entire gameplay period. Regardless of the change in risk behavior, the rounds 
with more shields took longer before the ship was destroyed, indicating that homeostatic 
processes through full compensation did not take place. Before the experiment, participants 
received different instructions that either explained or showed the consequences of safe 
behavior (no collisions) or of risky behavior (too high speed, collisions, destruction of the 
ship). While it was expected that participants would differ in their risk behavior depending 
on which instruction they had received, such differences did not emerge as significant. 
Whether no differences were found due to a weakness in the instructions or whether such 
different instructions generally have no effect on risk behavior should be subjected to future 
research. Subsequent studies should also experiment with different amounts of shields for 
the rounds and with different starting speeds for each round. 
Risk Homeostasis Theory remains a topic of considerable debate to the present day. 
Even though this thesis was able to shed some light on the mechanics of risk compensation, 
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which are an integral part of RHT, many of the underlying workings still remain undiscovered 
and should be a focal point in future research.  
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Spaceship Sprite 
 
 
 
Meteor Sprite 
 
 
 
Background Image 
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Example gameplay screenshot 
 
